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Cross-Situational Learning
Paul Ibbotson 1*, Diana G. López 2 and Alan J. McKane 2
1Childhood, Youth and Sports Group, Open University, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom, 2 Theoretical Physics Division,
School of Physics and Astronomy, University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom
Given that there is referential uncertainty (noise) when learning words, to what extent can
forgetting filter some of that noise out, and be an aid to learning? Using a Cross Situational
Learning model we find a U-shaped function of errors indicative of a “Goldilocks” zone
of forgetting: an optimum store-loss ratio that is neither too aggressive nor too weak, but
just the right amount to produce better learning outcomes. Forgetting acts as a high-pass
filter that actively deletes (part of) the referential ambiguity noise, retains intended
referents, and effectively amplifies the signal. The model achieves this performance
without incorporating any specific cognitive biases of the type proposed in the constraints
and principles account, and without any prescribed developmental changes in the
underlying learning mechanism. Instead we interpret the model performance asmore of a
by-product of exposure to input, where the associative strengths in the lexicon grow as a
function of linguistic experience in combination with memory limitations. The result adds
a mechanistic explanation for the experimental evidence on spaced learning and, more
generally, advocates integrating domain-general aspects of cognition, such as memory,
into the language acquisition process.
Keywords: cross-situational learning, noise, memory, forgetting, word learning
INTRODUCTION
Language learning mechanisms need to be robust enough to acquire normative patterns of use
in the face of considerable communicative noise. The term noise is used here to cover a range
of learning contexts where the world-to-word relationship is not one-to-one. For example, in
principle there are more things in the world that a word could refer to than a speaker intends
it to mean (Quine, 1960). This problem of referential indeterminacy, first explored in depth by
Wittgenstein (1955), has led some theorists to propose a priori constraints that limit the possibilities
of referents a learner needs to entertain when acquiring a new word. For example, Markman
(1989, 1992) proposed the whole object constraint (“assume a novel word refers to the whole
object”); the mutual exclusivity constraint (“assume novel words refer to unknown objects”) and
the taxonomic constraint (“labels should be extended to an object of the same kind rather than
an object that is thematically related”). Further work relaxed the all-or-nothing requirements of
a “constraint” with the more probabilistically applied “principles” (Golinkoff et al., 1994). For
example, the reference principle (“words map to objects, actions, attributes”) the extendability
principle (“words extend to other referents”) and the categorical scope principle (“words extend to
basic-level categories”).
A basic problem with the constraints and principles approach is that for any benefit a
bias confers to learn one class of words, it works in the opposite direction for another
class. For example, verbs, adjectives, prepositions, and non-typical nouns are quite common
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FIGURE 1 | An adult chooses a linguistic expression w1 associated with concept r1 that they want to communicate. At t1 the child does not know whether the novel
word w1 refers to r1 or r2 and for now the best she can do is remember the associations between the scene and the words. At t2 she hears w1 with one object r1
familiar from t1 and one new object r3. XSL works by repeatedly recording the associations between language and the context in which it is used. Over time, the
signal (an intentional word-referent pair) is more strongly represented than the noise (an unintentional word-referent pair). Items that appear in the dotted box are the
raw data on which the child (or in our case, the system) makes the cross-situational associations.
in early speech and do not map on to whole objects.
Performatives such as hello, please, and thank you, are again quite
common in child directed speech but are not referential. Besides
its debatable ability to provide any “in practice” advantage to
the learner, the constraints, and principles approach has a more
conceptual problem. With every constraint and principle added
to the list to explain acquisition, it reduces the power of the
theory in predicting findings that are not in the theory itself,
and ultimately reduces its falsifiability. What would be more
parsimonious and intellectually satisfying are explanations that
are simpler, deeper and are independently motivated. One such
approach is to see the word learning process as fundamentally
integrated with the developing social and cognitive world of
the child (Bruner, 1983; Tomasello, 1992, 2003; Nelson, 1996).
This predicts that the developing linguistic trajectory of the
child should be in part explainable by the developing trajectory
of other cognitive faculties such as memory, attention and
categorization (Ibbotson and Tomasello, 2009; Ibbotson et al.,
2012, 2013a,b, 2018; Kachergis, 2012; Ibbotson and Kearvell-
White, 2015; Kachergis and Yu, 2017).
Ever since Ebbinghaus (1913) there has been considerable
interest in the role that memory serves in learning. From a
developmental perspective, this is particularly relevant as we
know infants and children quickly forget information (e.g.,
Brainerd et al., 1990; Bauer et al., 2000; Rovee-Collier et al.,
2001; Vlach and Sandhofer, 2012). In this context forgetting
has traditionally—and understandably—been seen as detrimental
to learning, reducing the ability to recall known words and
to abstract categories. Recently however, the counter-intuitive
notion that forgetting is an aid to word learning and concept
generalization has received experimental support (forgetting-as-
abstraction account; Vlach et al., 2008, 2012; Delaney et al., 2010;
Vlach and Sandhofer, 2012; Toppino and Gerbier, 2014; Vlach,
2014). This work suggests spaced learning—distributing learning
events over time rather than massing learning together in close
succession—allows time for forgetting to occur between learning
events. Vlach (2014, p. 165) hints at why this regime might
improve learning by suggesting “forgetting promotes abstraction
by supporting memory for relevant features of a category and
deterring memory for irrelevant features of a category.” Here
we formally investigate this idea by exploring how forgetting
could deter memory for irrelevant features when learning a
word.
We investigate this in the context of a cross-situational
learning (XSL) model because (a) a large body of evidence
suggests that adults, children, and infants are sensitive to the
kind of co-occurrence information cross-situational learning
capitalizes on, and they use it in word learning (Gleitman, 1990;
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Pinker, 1994; Siskind, 1996; Akhtar and Montague, 1999; Roy
and Pentland, 2002; Frank et al., 2007; Xu and Tenenbaum,
2007; Yu and Smith, 2007; Smith and Yu, 2008; Yu, 2008; Blythe
et al., 2010; Cunillera et al., 2010; Fazly et al., 2010; Scott and
Fisher, 2012; Vlach and Johnson, 2013; Suanda et al., 2014)
and (b) the model gives us a reasonably easy way in which
to manipulate forgetting and thus investigate its role on word
learning. Informally, cross-situational learning essentially works
by using invariant properties in the world-to-word mapping to
hone in on the intended meaning, see Figure 1.
Of most relevance to the current study, Tilles and Fontanari
(2012) implemented a XSL model that attempted to address the
role of memory limitations in the context of word learning.
However, forgetting in their model proceeded in a linear fashion.
This limits its psychological relevance as ever since Ebbinghaus’
(1913) widely replicated findings on forgetting curves showed,
forgetting happens in a non-linear fashion, occurring most
rapidly right after learning occurs and slowing down over
time. Yurovsky and Frank (2015), improved the plausibility of
memory decay in a XSL model by formalizing it as a power
function (after Murdock, 1982; Anderson and Schooler, 1991;
Shiffrin and Steyvers, 1997) but they did not explicitly compare
the effect of forgetting vs. no forgetting, as we do here (see
also Kachergis et al., 2012). Their focus was on determining
whether learners accumulate graded, statistical evidence about
multiple referents for each word (e.g., Vouloumanos, 2008;
McMurray et al., 2012; Yurovsky et al., 2014) or track only a
single candidate referent (e.g., Medina et al., 2011; Trueswell
et al., 2013). Interestingly, they found cross-situational learning
involves elements of both types, but the success of learning,
importantly for this study, depends on limited attention and
memory. Here we extend this by implementing two different
versions of forgetting in our model, first, a relatively naive model
of forgetting and second, a more psychologically plausible model
based on an exponential decay function and other aspects of
memory performance that were not present in previous studies
(Kachergis et al., 2012; Tilles and Fontanari, 2012; Yurovsky
and Frank, 2015) (explained in detail in section The Forgetting
Mechanisms).
The question that follows from this is: Given that there is
referential uncertainty when learning words (noise), to what
extent can forgetting filter some of that noise out, and be an aid
to learning? In what follows we outline how forgetting interacts
with noise conceived of in three different ways: referential
ambiguity (“what a speaker intends to refer to vs. what they
could be referring to”) within-speaker variance (“the same
person referring to the same object in different ways”); between
speaker variance (“different people referring to the same object
differently”).
METHODS
The Lexicon
We consider the interactions between a child and a community
of adult speakers. To start with we assume that all adults are
identical in their language use (in section Between-Speaker
Variance we shall vary the degree to which adults share a lexicon).
The adult lexicon A(r,w) = P(w|r) is a list of probability
distributions over words w (w = 1, 2, ...W); one distribution
for each referent r (r = 1, 2, ...R). That is, A(r,w) is the
probability that the adult will utter the wordwwhen talking about
referent r. This implements our first level of communicative
noise, referential ambiguity, because, there are more referents
possible than there are words. These distributions are defined
once and remain constant throughout the simulations, so they
can be considered to be parameters of the model.
For any adult individual their language is indeterminate in the
sense that there is not a one-to-one mapping between a word and
a referent; this implements our next level of noise, within-speaker
variance. In everyday communicative contexts, the same speaker
is not guaranteed to use the same word for a given referent. For
example, a waitress might refer to a particular customer as the
postman, John, that man, him or even the sun glasses as in the
sunglasses never leaves a tip. Despite the variation in linguistic
form, interlocutors coordinate their representations so that the
same referent is identified across multiple situations. An example
of an adult lexicon is given in Table 1.
For the time scale that a child acquires her language (and the
time scale used in our simulations) we can approximate the group
level norms as stable (see Baxter et al., 2006, 2009 for statistical
approaches to modeling normative change). This means for any
adult individual in our model their language does not evolve
over time and by implication nor does the group. The lexicon
we implement in this model has a vocabulary of 10 words. The
model offered here is not intended to accurately represent all
aspects of a child’s word learning experience. It is meant to be
representative enough to explore how forgetting and speaker
variance work in principle, and there are reasons to assume that
results from XSL models with small vocabularies are scalable
(For example, Blythe et al., 2010 demonstrated mathematically
that there is no inherent combinatorial barrier preventing XSL
models operating under referential uncertainty from scaling up
to full-size lexicons).
TABLE 1 | Example of an adult lexicon A(r,w).
Words
Referents 1 2 3 4 … 8 9 10
1 0.75 0.25
2 0.25 0.5 0.25
3 0.25 0.5 0.25
4 0.25 0.5 …
… … … …
8 … 0.5 0.25
9 0.25 0.5 0.25
10 0.25 0.75
In this case there are 10 referents and 10 words and the matrix is tri-diagonal. Each line
corresponds to a referent r. The elements on each line sum up to 1 and they constitute a
probability distribution over words: element (i, j) is the probability that word j will be uttered
when talking about referent i. Non-specified elements are null. Note that each column is
not a probability distribution over referents, though in this simple example columns happen
to add up to 1.
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We define the child’s lexicon C (r,w) (t) in a similar way,
so that C (r,w) (t) = Q (w|r) (t) , but these quantities change
in time as the child learns: they constitute the variables of
our dynamical system. They represent the associative strength
between words and referents in the child’s memory at a given
time t since the beginning of the learning process; the child
begins the learning process with no associations between words
and referents. In practice element C(r,w)(t) is computed as the
(integer) number of tokens c(r,w) that the child has collected
up to time t (which is altered by memory loss; see explanation
in section The Forgetting Mechanisms below) divided by the
number n(r) of occurrences of referent r, C(r,w) = c(r,w)/n(r).
The group lexicon G(r,w) is the (normalized) sum of the
adults’ lexicons and represents the norm of the community of
speakers. The goal of the learning process is to allow the child
to build up a lexicon as close to the group lexicon as possible.
The Learning Algorithm
The dynamics of the system take place in the child’s lexicon
and involves two main processes (1) the acquisition of tokens—
via exposure to adult utterances (in the presence of pairs of
referents, an intended one and an incidental one)—and (2) the
loss of tokens (forgetting). The state of the child’s lexicon at
a given time is the dynamical result of those two opposing
processes. Everything it learns about the adult language, it does
so via experience of “usage events,” implemented in this model as
presentations of (ambiguous) referents and words. What a word
means in this language is the sum total of usage events it appeared
in. In terms of the actual simulation procedure, each iteration
(child-adult encounter) consists of the following steps:
(a) Pick a random adult with whom the child will interact
(this step only applies where we introduce between-speaker
variance; until then it is enough to consider a single adult).
(b) draw_refs: Draw two random referents, R1 and R2, from a
uniform distribution (other shapes will be explored in section
Between-Speaker Variance), without replacement.
(c) draw_word: Draw a word W from the line in the
adult’s lexicon that corresponds to referent R1, i.e., from the
distribution A(R1,w) (see Table 1 for an example of an adult
lexicon). This is the word uttered by the adult in the presence
of both referents R1 (the “target” referent, that the speaker
intends to refer to) and R2 (the “distractor” referent that gives
rise to a spurious association; see Figure 1).
(d) record_tokens: The child associates the two observed
referents to the word she has heard: add 1 to the quantity
c(R1, W) and to the quantity c(R2, W).
(e) give_mark: Measure how much the child has learnt (see
section Measures below).
(f)Apply naïve_forget OR Ebbinghaus_forget regime: See details
in section The Forgetting Mechanisms below.
The steps above describe how referential ambiguity is
implemented in our model. Following Blythe et al. (2010)
we do not assume any relationship between the sets of incidental
meanings associated with different target words, that is the
distractor or “noisy” word-referent associations. There may be
complete overlap between some sets of incidental meanings or
no overlap at all, because the distractor referent R2 is picked at
random each time.
The Forgetting Mechanisms
We consider in turn two alternative forgetting mechanisms,
which we shall refer to as “naive forgetting” and “Ebbinghaus
forgetting” respectively.
The “naive forgetting mechanism” consists in
deterministically removing one token from every non-zero
entry in the child’s lexicon c(r,w) every m iterations, where m
is the so-called memory parameter. This mechanism is naive in
the sense that the number of tokens c(r,w) decreases linearly
in time (in the absence of new evidence), at a rate (1/m) which
is independent of the current number of tokens, as well as
being independent of the rate at which tokens are added to
that element of the child’s lexicon. We use this mechanism as a
baseline against which to compare the following more complex,
non-linear forgetting mechanism and to replicate the memory
implementation of Tilles and Fontanari (2012).
The “Ebbinghaus forgetting mechanism” is inspired by the
findings of Ebbinghaus (1913), and subsequent researchers who
formalize human memory performance as a non-linear function
(Murdock, 1982; Anderson and Schooler, 1991; Shiffrin and
Steyvers, 1997; Yurovsky and Frank, 2015). For example, one
model which has had success in capturing the effects of practice
and the effects of retention interval—namely that repetition
improves recall, and increased temporal spacing improves
recall—is the ACT-R model (e.g., Anderson and Lebiere,
1998). ACT-R’s activation equation represents the strength of a
memory item as the sum of a number of individual memory
strengthenings, each corresponding to a past practice event.
Using a modified ACT-R model Pavlik and Anderson (2005)
accounted for standard spacing effects in various conditions and
showed that wide spacing of practice provides increasing benefits
as practice accumulates. They extendACT-R’s activation equation
by introducing a variable decay-rate function. According to this
mechanism, the forgetting rate for each presentation of amemory
chunk is a function of the activation of the chunk at time of
presentation. We implement a similar trajectory of forgetting
in our discrete-token framework by letting the forgetting of
tokens happen stochastically at a constant rate per token per
timestep, so that the time at which the token will disappear
follows a decreasing exponential distribution. So we assign to
each word-referent token a small probability d per timestep
that it will be deleted from the child’s memory (weakening the
associative strength of that word-referent pair). The probabilities
per timestep to increase or decrease the number of tokens c(r,w)
by one unit can be written p+1r,w = pr,w and p
−1
r,w = dr,w ·
c(r,w) respectively. Note that pr,w also depends on the particular
word-use distribution under consideration (see section Between-
Speaker Variance and Appendix 1 in Supplementary Material).
Ebbinghaus also demonstrated that it takes longer to forget
material after each subsequent re-learning. In our model, unlike
Yurovsky and Frank (2015) and Tilles and Fontanari (2012), we
therefore keep track of the total number of tokens that have
ever been added to that referent-word slot,Nr,w(t) (“repetitions”).
The probability of forgetting each token, dr,w, decreases as Nr,w
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grows. Also, the forgetting rate should depend not on the absolute
number of times that a given word-referent association has been
heard, but on its relative frequency with respect to the total
number of tokens heard so far, N(t) =
∑
r,w Nr,w(t). Care
must be taken in order to avoid introducing an undesired time-
dependence. For this reason, we chose an exponential decrease
of the forgetting rate with the relative number of repetitions, as
follows:
dr,w
(
Nr,w/N
)
=
1
d0
exp
(
−Nr,w/N
d1
)
. (1)
Parameter 1/d0 is the forgetting rate of seldom-encountered
word-referent associations (and therefore it is the forgetting rate
of a word-referent token which has just been encountered for
the first time). Parameter d1 governs the drop in the forgetting
rate of often-encountered tokens with respect to that of seldom-
encountered tokens; when the evidence for a word-referent
association accounts for a fraction d1 of the total evidence
collected by the child, the forgetting rate for those tokens will be
reduced to 36% (e−1) of the initial rate 1/d0. See Figure 2 for an
example of such a curve with fixed initial forgetting rate 1/d0 and
for different values of the relative-repetition-scale d1.
Measures
We consider the dynamic child lexicon C(r,w)(t) to be an
approximation of the “true” static group lexicon G(r,w). In order
to evaluate how good that approximation is, i.e., how much the
child has learnt by a given time t, we employ the following three
complementary measures (for ease of writing we omit their time
dependence).
FIGURE 2 | Details of the Ebbinghaus forgetting mechanism described in
section The Forgetting Mechanisms. The forgetting rate of a token is 1/d0
(= 0.01 in this graph) the first time it is encountered, and then decreases with
the relative number of repetitions of that word-referent pair. The scale of this
decrease is given by parameter d1 (see Equation 1).
1. Child errors. For each referent r, we define an error
committed by the child as
E (r) =
1
W0
W0∑
w0=1
C (r,w0) , (2)
where the sum is over the words that should never be used to refer
to r, according to the group lexicon, {w0} = {w | G(r,w) = 0}.
Then averaging over referents, E = 1R
∑R
r=1 E (r). The output of
this measure is interpreted as a probability of the child forming
an error, defined as an association between a word and a referent
that is not present in the adults’ lexicon (a zero entry in Table 1).
We assume that there is more to learning than the absence of
errors so the next two measures give us different perspectives on
the type of relationship between the child’s lexicon and the adults’;
one from the perspective of significance difference (Chi-squared)
and one from the perspective of strength of association (Pearson’s
correlation coefficient).
2. Chi-squared. For each referent r,
χ2 (r) =
W∑
w=1
[C (r,w)− G (r,w)]2
G (r,w)
, (3)
Then averaging, χ2 = 1R
∑R
r=1 χ
2 (r). Chi-Squared essentially
tests whether the distributions which constitute the child’s lexicon
are significantly different from those of the adults. The output of
this measure varies between 0 (tending toward a non-significance
difference between adult and child lexicons) to 1 (tending toward
a significant difference).
3. Pearson’s correlation coefficient. For each referent r,
P(r)=
∑W
w=1
(
C(r,w)− 〈Cr〉
) (
G(r,w)− 〈Gr〉
)
√∑W
w=1
(
C(r,w)− 〈Cr〉
)2 √∑W
w=1
(
G(r,w)− 〈Gr〉
)2
(4)
where the average of C is given by
〈Cr〉 =
1
W
W∑
w=1
C(r,w) .
The coefficient is then averaged over referents, P =
1
R
∑R
r=1 P (r) . Pearson’s correlation coefficient tests the
strength of association between the child’s and adults’ lexicon.
The output of this measure varies between −1 (perfect negative
linear relationship) to 0 (no linear relationship) to +1 (perfect
positive linear relationship).
Together these three measures show us to what extent the
child’s lexicon has converged on that of the adults’.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The Role of Forgetting
First we report the learning curves of the XSL model for
both of the naive and Ebbinghaus forgetting mechanisms. The
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FIGURE 3 | Learning curves for the naive model of forgetting, for different values of the memory parameter m. Performance measures are plotted on the y-axis, time
is plotted on the x-axis on a logarithmic scale. For ease of inspection we separate the graphs into low values of m (Left) and high values of m (Right). The curves
shown are averages over 100 runs for each parameter value; the lexicon used is tri-diagonal as in Table 1 and contains 10 words, and no between-adult diversity is
considered.
learning curves are plots of performance measures of the child
(Equations 2–4) as a function of time t, where time stands for the
number of iterations of the simulation algorithm of section The
learning Algorithm. Less formally, time represents the number of
adult-child “interactions.” Because each interaction implies the
exposure of a word to the child, time here is identical to corpus
size, defined as the number of (not necessarily unique) words that
the child has been exposed to.
Figures 3, 4 show that the model learns incrementally to
approximate the adult lexicon as demonstrated by the reduction
in child errors to negligible amounts (10−2) and the relationship
between the child lexicon and the adult lexicon becoming
stronger over time (cf. section Measures). By using the logic
of XSL the child lexicon is approximating that of the adult
lexicon and in this regard we have shown that our model is
robust to the effects of referential ambiguity and within-speaker
variance implemented in the learning procedure. Like Siskind
(1996), Yu (2008), and Fazly et al. (2010) we have also shown
that the learning rate increases quickly early on in development
and then gradually stabilizes. This is important for two reasons.
First, it shows that despite the constant revision of lexical
knowledge inherent in the cross-situational mechanism, this does
not undermine the consolidation and stabilization of lexical
learning (c.f. the problem of catastrophic inference observed in
many connectionist models). Second, the general shape of the
developmental trajectory is similar to that of the developmental
data from longitudinal studies of vocabulary acquisition, where
growth is slow in the beginning, accelerates, and then levels off
again (e.g., Kamhi, 1986; Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1987; Reznick
and Goldfield, 1992). Importantly, our model replicates this
trajectory yet has no need for the cognitive constraints or
biases that have been proposed to account for this “vocabulary
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FIGURE 4 | Learning curves for the Ebbinghaus model of forgetting, for different values of the parameter 1/d1 and using d0 = 0.01 (see Equation 1 in section The
Forgetting Mechanisms). Performance measures are plotted on the y-axis, time is plotted on the x-axis. Curves shown are averages over 100 runs, using a 10-word
tri-diagonal lexicon and no between-adult diversity.
spurt,” for example; a shift from associationist to a referential
word meaning mechanism (Nazzi and Bertoncini, 2003); a
realization that objects have names (Kamhi, 1986; Reznick and
Goldfield, 1992); the development of categorization abilities
(Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1987); or the onset of word learning
constraints (Behrend, 1990). Following Huttenlocher et al. (1991)
and Fazly et al. (2010) we interpret this developmental trajectory
as more of a by-product of exposure to input, where the
associative strengths in the lexicon grow as a function of linguistic
experience. This interpretation seems to fit with the design of
our model where learning takes place without incorporating
any specific cognitive biases or constraints and without any
prescribed developmental changes in the underlying learning
mechanism.
Figures 3, 4 also clearly demonstrate that cross-situational
learning is dependent on the balance between forgetting and
remembering or the storage-loss ratio. On first inspection there
appears to be a critical window between extremes of the
memory parameters (high vs. low in Figures 3, 4) where learning
is optimal. To confirm whether this is true (and for which
developmental time periods) we plotted (Figure 5) cross-sections
of the learning curves displayed in Figures 3, 4, to gain a more
subtle division of forgetting than “high” vs. “low.” This allows us
to see more clearly how the parameters affect learning for a given
moment in time.
Figure 5 shows that the long-term dynamics of the child
errors in the naive forgetting model seem to fall into three
different regimes, depending on the value of the memory
parameterm:
E (t →∞) ∼


constant (m) > 0, m < M0
t−b → 0, M0 < m < M1
constant′ (m) > 0, m > M1.
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FIGURE 5 | Performance of the Naive and Ebbinghaus forgetting models as a function of the memory parameters (m and 1/d1 respectively) and developmental time
points tf at which the child lexicon is evaluated with respect to the group one. Averages over 1,000 runs, rest of parameters as in Figures 3, 4.
By inspection,M0 ≈ 17−19 andM1 ≈ 80−90 for the parameter
values used (number of words in lexicon, number of referents
shown at once, etc).
If forgetting events are too frequent (low values of m), the
lexicon never accumulates enough experience (word-referent
pairs) to approximate the adult lexicon. In other words, there is
not enough time for the cross-situational learning mechanism
to build up a strong enough signal before the signal is
deleted. Perhaps less obviously, if forgetting events are too
rare (high values of m), the errors that are learnt (spurious
word-referent associations) persist as frozen background noise
in the child’s memory alongside the correct word-referent
mappings dampening the overall performance of the model.
These different regimes are further illustrated in Appendix 2
(Supplementary Material).
Presumably the limiting value of the child errors when there
is no forgetting at all (m → ∞) would be higher the larger
the number of referents that were visualized simultaneously (e.g.,
two instead of one distractor, keeping all other parameters equal);
this is essentially what Fazly et al. (2010) found, namely cleaner
input (less distractor items) made word learning easier. The
limiting value of the child errors would also be higher if the
language itself were more complex, in the sense that the adult
lexicon distributions A(r,w) were wider or even had several
peaks.
In summary, the U-shaped function of the Child Errors
in Figure 5 points to a “Goldilocks” zone of forgetting: an
optimum store-loss ratio that is neither too aggressive or too
weak, but just the right amount to produce better learning
outcomes. Fundamentally, the advantage of a certain degree of
forgetting over no forgetting at all is due to the interaction
between the XSLmechanism and the noise-to-signal ratio. Across
different situations the noise levels are lower than the signal
levels (intended word-referent pair) because we assume people
use labels across situations with some consistency (but not
entirely consistently either). Under these assumptions, forgetting
disproportionally affects the noise as it has fewer tokens to
delete from experience than the signal and will therefore more
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frequently approach a zero association. In the case of spurious
associations this effect directly improves the performance of the
model as any non-zero associations that exist in the child that
do not exist in the adult are recoded as errors. In other words,
forgetting acts as a high-pass filter that actively deletes (part of)
the referential ambiguity noise which masks the adult lexicon as
seen from the perspective of the child.
It is noticeable from Figure 5 that there is a slight shift in this
optimum storage-loss ratio for learning from more aggressive
forgetting early on in development to less aggressive later on in
development. In other words, it pays to forget more aggressively
early on in language development and this facet of the model
fits with an improving trajectory of memory performance as the
child develops (Brainerd et al., 1990; Bauer et al., 2000; Rovee-
Collier et al., 2001; Vlach and Sandhofer, 2012). It also serves
to underscore the complex dynamics of the component parts
involved in the process of word learning a memory: what is an
optimum store/loss ratio at one point in development is not
necessarily true across development.
Finally we present a direct comparison between the naive and
the Ebbinghaus models of forgetting by choosing the optimum
memory parameters based on how the models performed after
104 iterations—the stopping point in this simulation (Figure 6).
One might have expected the Ebbinghaus model to have
performed slightly better due to the rapid decay of associative
strength it applies to infrequently encountered items, thus
dampening the effects of noise. Figure 6 shows no overall
advantage for the Ebbinghaus model using these optima for
the time scale of 101-104 iterations. It appears the added
complexity of the Ebbinghaus mechanism does not translate
into a significant improvement in performance when compared
with the naive mechanism. One potential reason for this is
that the “naive” mechanism actually incorporates one aspect
of the more sophisticated exponential decay function model.
Its forgetting rate is 1/m per element in the child’s lexicon
matrix, which translates into a per-token forgetting rate that
decreases as the number of tokens c(r,w) grows. So the naive
mechanism actually shares this reinforcement characteristic of
the Ebbinghaus mechanism yet is much simpler.
Importantly for the main point we are establishing here both
models learn the adult lexicon in the face of communicative
noise and both show an optimum storage-loss ratio for cross-
situational learning. We demonstrate here for a XSL model what
Elman (1993) showed for a connectionist model of grammar
learning; implementing a more plausible (and limited) memory
capacity into a model can actually have pay-offs in terms of
learning performance.
The next set of analyses concern the effect of and between-
speaker variance. We keep both mechanisms of forgetting, to
see if the performance of naive and Ebbinghaus models can be
separated in terms of this new factor.
Between-Speaker Variance
So far we have considered two types of noise. Referential
ambiguity and within-speaker variance noise where the
word-referent mappings are generally not one-to-one, so each
adult has a certain flexibility in the choice of words when talking
FIGURE 6 | Comparison of the performance of the naive and Ebbinghaus
forgetting mechanisms: learning curves corresponding to the optimal
parameter values (optimal within the region explored in Figures 3, 4).
about a fixed referent. We now introduce a third source of
noise that formalizes the notion that different speakers are
not guaranteed to use the same linguistic items in exactly
the same way, even if they are members of the same speech
community (Figure 7) The prevailing wisdom in linguistics has
been that adults that talk the same language converge on the
same grammar (Crain and Lillo-Martin, 1999, p. 9; Seidenberg,
1997, p. 1600; Nowak et al., 2001, p. 114). Psycholinguistic
experiments have begun to question this assumption, showing
that significant variation exists in adults’ use of a number of
canonical grammatical constructions (Brooks and Sekerina,
2006; Dabrowska, 2008, 2012; Street and Dabrowska, 2010).
While the case for grammar has proven controversial, the claim
that people of the same speech community have different (but
overlapping) vocabularies should be less controversial. We
therefore implement idiosyncratic language use at the level of
lexicon.
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FIGURE 7 | Between-speaker variation. The child faces multiple sources of
information when learning her language not all of which are entirely consistent
with one another. There is some overlap between speakers, after all, this is
partly what defines them as members of the same speech community. But
importantly they do not overlap entirely—each person has their own idiolect.
We implement between-speaker variance as follows. We start
by building an auxiliary lexicon F(r,w) which is once again a list
of probability distributions over words, one for each referent. We
build adult j’s distribution Aj(r,w) by drawing s samples from the
F(r,w) distribution. Then as usual we sum the NA adult lexicons
to construct the group lexicon, G (r,w) = 1NA
∑NA
j=1 A
j(r,w). The
higher the number of samples s used to build the adult lexicons,
the higher the similarity of F and G, and of any pair of adult
lexicons Aj and Ak, i.e., the lower the diversity in the population
of speakers. An example of this process is given in Figure 8.
The sum of all adult’s lexicons, the group lexicon, is the
object against which the child’s progress is measured. As before,
performance is judged by our three measures after 104 iterations
and as a function of the forgetting mechanism, Figure 9.
As before, reduction in the Child Error scores and
a convergence of the child lexicon to the adult lexicons
demonstrates the model is learning the intended word-referent
pairs, and approximating the associative strength of these
pairs that is shared by the community it is learning from.
In summary, Figure 9 demonstrates XSL is a robust enough
learning mechanism to converge of intended word-referent pairs
despite between-speaker variance, a situation the child does find
themselves in everyday communicative contexts. As before, both
naive and Ebbinghaus mechanisms show storage-loss optima
under all values of s with performance between values only
distinguishable on the Chi-squared and Pearson’s measures.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
For the language learner, multiple sources of indeterminacy or
noise provide a fuzzy and probabilistic relationship between the
words people use and the world to which they refer. Clearly
children do learn despite this indeterminacy, so at a general level,
it is possible to think of language acquisition as a signal detection
task that takes place in a noisy environment.
Our computational model learned word-referent pairs under
three types of noise: referential ambiguity, within-speaker
variance and between speaker variance. The implication is that
XSL is powerful enough to be useful to the child born into a world
where speakers use words ambiguously, where they use different
words for the same referents and where different speakers use
different words for the same referent. The model achieved this
performance without incorporating any specific cognitive biases
of the type proposed in the constraints and principles account
(e.g., Markman, 1989, 1992; Golinkoff et al., 1994) and without
any prescribed developmental changes in the underlying learning
mechanism.
Instead we were interested in the extent to which word
learning could benefit from being integrated with the domain-
general cognitive capacity of memory (and forgetting). By
implementing different regimes of forgetting, we found a U-
shaped function of the Child Errors from Experiments 1
and 2 that points to a “Goldilocks” zone of forgetting: an
optimum store-loss ratio that is neither too aggressive nor too
weak, but just the right amount to produce better learning
outcomes.
We suggest that the reason for this is that forgetting
disproportionally affects the noise as it has fewer tokens to
delete from experience than the signal and will therefore more
frequently approach a zero association. In the case of spurious
associations this effect directly improves the performance of
the model as any non-zero associations that exist in the child
that do not exist in the adult are recoded as errors. This
adds a mechanistic insight in to the experimental evidence that
forgetting can improve word-learning and concept abstraction
(forgetting-as-abstraction account; Vlach et al., 2008, 2012;
Delaney et al., 2010; Vlach and Sandhofer, 2012; Toppino and
Gerbier, 2014; Vlach, 2014). Vlach (2014, p. 165) suggested
“forgetting promotes abstraction by supporting memory for
relevant features of a category and deterring memory for
irrelevant features of a category.” In our model, we suggest that
this situation comes about when forgetting acts as a high-pass
filter that actively deletes (part of) the referential ambiguity noise.
XSL models are examples of a wider trend in linguistics
toward adopting a more probabilistic approach to syntactic
and lexical processing and representing language in more
dynamic and graded terms (e.g., Harris, 1981; Ellis, 2002;
MacDonald and Christiansen, 2002; Jurafsky, 2003; Taylor,
2003). The incremental and probabilistic approach of the model
means it never completely stops learning or readjusting the
weights of associations—although this weight adjustment is more
significant early on in development which is why the learning
curves are more erratic at the start. The flexibility in the XSL
method allows for life-long language learning and readjustment.
Dabrowska has shown significant variation in competence in
the adult population on a range of canonical language forms
(Dabrowska, 2008, 2012; Street and Dabrowska, 2010). The fact
that adult performance on “core grammar” such as passives,
complex sentences, quantifiers, and morphological inflection can
be significantly boosted after intensive exposure to these forms
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FIGURE 8 | The diversity-generating procedure. The top left matrix shows the auxiliary lexicon from which the 5 adult lexicons shown below have been sampled (it is
the tri-diagonal lexicon of Table 1). The more samples that are taken from the original lexicon the closer the adult is to the original lexicon and to the other adults; in
this example the number of samples is s = 5. Low sampling equals high between-speaker diversity and high sampling equals low between-speaker diversity.
Performance is judged against the aggregate lexicon of all adults (top right). The real world analog here is that the child is effectively judged against the sum total of
lexicons it might encounter while learning.
(i.e., training), shows that any learning system needs to capable
of readjustment even late on in development.
The constant revisions of XSL may also be considered one
of its weaknesses and is the reason that the errors in our
model never reach zero. However, the learning curves do show
that learning stabilizes. This is because revisions to associative
strengths are divided by the denominator of all previous events.
The result is that greater and greater evidence is required later
on in development to overturn an association. This process is
similar to the idea of entrenchment or canalization whereby a
linguistic unit is established as a cognitive routine the more it
is “rehearsed” in the mind of the speaker (Langacker, 1987).
Entrenchment is a matter of degree and essentially amounts
to strengthening whatever response the system makes to the
inputs that it receives (Hebb, 1949; Allport, 1985). Once this
entrenchment is established as a routine it can be difficult
to reverse. For example, Japanese speakers find it difficult
to discriminate between /r/ and /l/ because it activates a
single representation, whereas for English-speakers the two
representations remain separately entrenched (Munakata and
McClelland, 2003).
One might argue that due to the probabilistic nature of cross-
situational learning means the correct referent should always
emerge from the noise, so what is the added value of forgetting?
It is true that the correct referent has the highest probability
of emerging from the noise if enough time has elapsed. In
previous models, that probability is actively increased due to
extra reinforcement mechanisms which are usually considered
alongside XSL (but which are distinct from XSL) and which
serve to accelerate the learning process. For example, Fazly et al.
(2010) use an “alignment step” which uses previous evidence to
guess meanings (assuming that the child operates in an optimal
Bayesian way), so that previous correct evidence is reinforced.
Our forgetting mechanism is an alternative way to effectively
reinforce the correct pairings by actively reducing the strength
of the erroneous pairings (more precisely, of the weaker pairings,
which happen to be the erroneous ones due to the nature of XSL).
This is in addition to the fact that we need forgetting because
(1) people do have imperfect storage, access and retrieval of
information (2) some forgetting improves learning performance
when compared with models that have no forgetting or too much
forgetting.
One conclusion we can draw from this work is that integrating
aspects of domain-general cognition into probabilistic/statistical
approaches to learning can create more psychologically plausible
models and may improve model performance (Elman, 1993;
Ibbotson and Tomasello, 2009; Ibbotson et al., 2012, 2013a,b,
2018; Kachergis, 2012; Tilles and Fontanari, 2012; Ibbotson and
Kearvell-White, 2015; Yurovsky and Frank, 2015; Kachergis and
Yu, 2017).
More generally, the fact that integrating a plausible account
of memory improves word learning provides further support for
the view that the complexity of language emerges through the
interaction of cognition and language use over time (Langacker,
1987, 1991; Croft, 1991; Givón, 1995; Tomasello, 2003; Goldberg,
2006; Bybee, 2010).
The role of forgetting has been argued to have an important
role not just in learning associations but generalizing knowledge
to new instances—a fundamental part of the creative aspect
of acquiring a language (Vlach et al., 2008, 2012; Vlach and
Sandhofer, 2012; Vlach, 2014). Following Vlach (2014), we add
further support to the idea that the mechanism that researchers
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FIGURE 9 | Effect of different degrees of inter-adult diversity on performance as a function of the parameters of the two forgetting mechanisms (m and 1/d1; see
Equation 1 and section The Forgetting Mechanisms). Lower s values denote higher between-speaker variance. “no diversity” is equivalent to the situation in the
previous two analyses of sections The Role of Forgetting and Between-Speaker Variance. A uniform word-use distribution is used. Averages are taken over 100 runs
and other parameter values are as in Figures 3, 4.
have traditionally thought of as inhibiting learning—forgetting—
may actually promote learning words. We add to this account
that it is not just “forgetting” but the right amount of forgetting
and the reason why this amount of forgetting works. Learning
is boosted in the Goldilocks zone of forgetting where memory
for noisy associations is deleted, intended referents are retained,
and the signal is effectively amplified. Vlach (2014, p. 168)
“Parents, educators, and scientists may want to reconsider a long-
held, intuitive assumption that forgetting uniformly constrains
children’s ability to learn.”
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